This paper presents a dynamic technique for statistically estimating three p r ogram characteristics that a ect a program's computational behavior: 1 the probability that a particular section of a program is executed, 2 the probability that the particular section a ects the data state, and 3 the probability that a data state produced by that section has an e ect on program output. These three characteristics can be used to predict whether faults are likely to be uncovered by software testing.
Introduction
Software testing has several advantages over other veri cation forms: it relies on less formal analysis than a technique such as proof of correctness, it replicates operational behavior, and it has a statistical basis. However, software testing has drawbacks: any predictions based on software testing depend on an assumed input distribution. If the assumed input distribution is inaccurate, or if the input distribution changes over time, any predictions based on software testing can beinvalidated. When testing reveals a failure, it provides little help in locating the fault. Finally, testing requires an oracle; since automated oracles are rarely available, human oracles who require time and sometimes get the wrong results which misleads testers are required.
The technique described in this paper complements software testing. The technique, called propagation, infection, and execution analysis or PIE analysis 25 , is closely related to faultbased testing 16, 15, 17, 18, 3, 24, 27 and mutation testing 4, 5, 2, 22, 7, 19, 20 . PIE analysis is distinct from both mutation testing and fault-based testing because PIE analysis collects information concerning the semantics of the program; fault-based testing collects information concerning whether certain classes of faults exist in a program; and mutation testing judges whether sets of inputs are adequate at catching faults. The technique PIE analysis does not reveal the existence of faults; correctness is never an issue. Nor does the technique directly evaluate the ability of inputs to reveal the existence of faults. Instead, PIE analysis identi es locations in a program where faults, if they exist, are more likely to remain undetected during This paper was written while author was supported by a National Research Council Nasa-Langley Resident Research Associateship. Since writing this article, author as accepted a position at: Reliable Software Technologies Corporation, Penthouse Suite, 1001 N. Highland Street, Arlignton, VA 22201. testing. A location in PIE analysis is: an assignment, input statement, output statement, or the condition part of an if or while statement.
PIE analysis requires no oracle and no speci cation. No oracle is needed because this is not a veri cation technique. PIE analysis does require an input distribution. PIE analysis uses program instrumentation, syntax mutation, and changed values injected into data states to predict a location's ability to cause program failure if the location were to contain a fault. The program inputs are selected at random consistent with an assumed input distribution. This analysis does not require a testing oracle because PIE analysis uses the program itself as an oracle for examining the output of altered versions of the program.
The technique measures the e ect that a location of the program has on the program's dynamic computational behavior when:
1. The program is executed with inputs selected from a particular input distribution. This estimates the frequency with which inputs execute the location. 2. The location is mutated via syntactic mutants. This estimates the frequency with which mutants of the location create altered data states. 3. The data state created by the location has a value in it changed. This estimates the frequency with which altered data states cause a change in the program's output. Since these scenarios dynamically simulate the three necessary and su cient conditions for software failure to occur, PIE analysis is a dynamic failure-based technique.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: x2 describes the theoretical model that PIE analysis is based on; the PIE analysis technique that implements this model is presented in x3. x4 presents an application of PIE analysis, and x5 presents results using the PIE analysis technique.
Theoretical Model

General De nitions
We view a program as an implementation of a function g that maps a domain of possible inputs to a range of possible outputs. Another function f with the same domain and perhaps di erent range represents the desired behavior of g. An oracle is a recursive predicate on input-output pairs that checks whether or not f has been implemented for an input, i.e., oracle !x; y is TRUE i fx = y. Then the oracle is used with gx for y. During testing, it is necessary to be able to say whether a particular output of a program is correct or incorrect for a particular input x, with the latter implying that gx 6 = fx, and the former implying that gx = fx. The failure p r obability of program P, with respect to an input distribution D, P D , is the probability that P produces an incorrect output for an input selected at random according to D.
In PIE analysis, it is necessary to uniquely identify speci c syntactic program constructs as well as the internal data states created during execution. To uniquely identify syntactic constructs, we de ne a location to beeither an assignment statement, an input statement, an output statement, or the condition part of a if or while statement. Our de nition for location is based on Korel's 10 de nition for a single instruction.
A program data state is a set of mappings between all variables declared and dynamically allocated and their values at a point during execution; in a data state we include both the program input used for this execution and the value of the program counter. We only identify data states between two dynamically consecutive locations. The execution of a location is considered here to beatomic, hence data states can only beviewed between locations. As an example, the data state finput, 3, a, 5, b, 5, c, unde ned, pc, 10g tells that variables a and b have the value 5, the next instruction to beexecuted is at address 10, variable c is unde ned, and the program input that started this execution was a 3. Before program execution on an input begins, all variables are unde ned.
A data state error is an incorrect variable value pairing in a data state where correctness is determined by an assertion between locations. We refer to a data state error as an infection, and use these two terms interchangeably. If a data state error exists, the data state and variable with the incorrect value at that point are termed infected. A data state may have more than one infected variable. Propagation of a data state error occurs when a data state error a ects the output. Cancellation has occurred when the existence of a data state error is not discernible in the program output, i.e., after viewing the output, we have no indication that a data state error ever occurred. Cancellation is commonly referred to as coincidental correctness. In this paper, we do not look at intermediate locations for data state error cancellation; only at output locations.
If there exists at least one input from a distribution D for which a program P fails, then we say that P contains a fault with respect to D. Even though we may know that a fault exists in a program, we cannot in general identify a single location as the exclusive cause of the failure. For example, several locations may i n teract to cause the failure, or the program can be missing a required computation which could be inserted in many di erent places to correct the problem. However, if a program is annotated with assertions about the correct data state before and after a particular location l, and if there exists an input from D such that l's succeeding data state violates the assertion and l's preceding data state does not violate the assertion, then l contains a fault.
In PIE analysis, it is important to be able to determine whether a particular variable at some speci c location of a program has any potential impact on the output computation of the program. A v ariable is termed live at a particular location if this potential exists. Determination of whether a variable is live is made statically from a ow graph that is augmented with def-use information. Admittedly, certain variables de ned as live via static analysis using a ow graph containing def-use information might not bede ned as live if our de nition were based on the dynamic behavior of the program 9 .
Model De nitions
This section formalizes:
1. The probability that a location is executed|an execution probability. 2. The probability that a change to the source program causes a change in the resulting internal computational state|an infection probability.
3. The probability that a forced change in an internal computational state propagates and causes a c hange in the program's output|a propagation probability. To de ne execution, infection, and propagation probabilities, we rst introduce notation. Recall this technique tracks data states as a program executes. It is therefore necessary to uniquely identify a data state according to the input that the program is currently executing on, the last location executed in the program where we are observing the data state, and which iteration of the location we are observing this data state on if the location is executed more than once for this input.
Let S denote a speci cation, P denote an implementation of S, x denote a program input, denote the set of all possible inputs to P, D denote the probability distribution of , l denote a program location in P, and let i denote a particular execution or what we term an iteration" of location l caused by input x. Let B lPix represent the data state that exists prior to executing location l on the i th execution from input x 2 , and let A lPix represent the data state produced after executing location l on the i th execution from input x.
It is important for us to beable to group data states into sets with similar properties. For instance, assume that location l is executed n xl times by input x. Then we might want to look at all of the data states that are created by this input immediately before l is executed or immediately after l is executed. The following sets allow u s to do so: B lPx = fB lPix j 1 i n xl g A lPx = fA lPix j 1 i n xl g We further group these sets for all x 2 : lP = fB lPx j x 2 g lP = fA lPx j x 2 g
We let f l denote the function that is computed at a location l. The input to a function computed at a location is a data state and the output of such a function is also a data state. Thus B lPix f l ,! A lPix :
The execution probability " lPD of location l of program P is simply the probability that a randomly selected input x selected according to D will execute location l.
Let M l represent a set of z l mutants of location l: fm l1 ; m l2 ; :::; m lz l g where 1 y z l 22, 7, 19, 20 . And let f m ly denote the function computed by mutant m ly . The infection probability m ly lPD of mutant m ly is the probability that the succeeding data state of location l is di erent than the succeeding data state that mutant m ly creates, given that l and m ly execute on a data state that would normally precede l one that would be created by a randomly selected input according to D.
We de ne a simulated infection as a changed value forced into the value of some variable that already had a value in a data state. As we have already stated, A lPix denotes the data state created after the i th iteration of location l on input x;
A lPix denotes this same data state after a simulated infection is injected into A lPix . A simulated infection a ects a single live variable.
The propagation probability ailPD for a simulated infection a ecting variable a in the i th data state succeeding location l where this data state is created by a randomly selected input x according to D is the probability that P's output di ers from what would normally be produced after execution is resumed using the simulated infection.
Estimations of the Theoretical Model
We can estimate the previous three probabilities using a set of program inputs that are selected at random according to D. Three analyses are used for estimating the execution probability, infection probability, and propagation probability: Execution analysis, Infection analysis, and Propagation analysis. These methods are the focus of x3 and collectively are termed PIE analysis.
Before we describe these analyses, we assume several properties about any program undergoing PIE analysis as well as knowledge about the program's environment:
1. The program is close to being correct, meaning that it compiles and is believed to be close to a correct version of the speci cation both semantically and syntactically; this essentially is the competent programmer hypothesis 22 . If this property is not met, PIE analysis will still deliver estimates; however, the estimates will be of less signi cance. The closeness is required because the con dence in the applicability o f the resulting estimates diminishes as we move further away from the assumption. 2. A distribution of inputs, D, i s a vailable from which we can sample. 3. The inputs that we sample are only from . 4. The cardinality of is e ectively in nite for sampling purposes. Although there are nitely many numbers representable on a computer, we will assume this xed number exceeds what can be exhaustively sampled from during testing.
Execution Analysis
Execution analysis is a method that is based on program structure. As such, execution analysis is related to structural testing methods. Structural testing methods attempt to cover speci c types of software structure with at least one input. For example, statement testing is a structural testing method that attempts to execute every statement at least once; branch testing is a structural testing method that attempts to execute each branch at least once. Execution analysis estimates the probability o f executing a particular location when inputs are selected according to a particular input distribution.
Statement testing and branch testing are weak criteria because their satisfaction does not ensure failure should a fault exist. Executing a statement during statement testing and not observing program failure merely provides one data point for estimating whether or not the statement contains a fault. Execution analysis bene ts structural testing methods by indicating the likelihood of executing a particular statement.
Execution Analysis estimates execution probabilities. The execution estimate of execution probability " lPD is denoted by" lPD |it is found by nding the proportion of inputs selected according to D that cause location l is executed. As will be discussed further in x3.5, a potential exists for inputs that are selected according to D to appear to cause non-terminating computations. For this reason, if a non-terminating computation is suspected, a mechanism within execution analysis will be required that will terminate execution analysis on that input meaning that input will be ignored. This situation may cause the resulting execution estimates to bea function of some input distribution other than D, but regardless, such a mechanism is needed.
Infection Analysis
Infection analysis is similar to the processes employed in fault-based testing. Fault-based testing aims at demonstrating that certain faults are not in a program. Morell 18, 16, 15, 17, 3 proves properties about fault-based strategies concerning certain faults that can and cannot beeliminated using fault-based testing. Since fault-based testing restricts the class of possible faults, the possible testing is limited. Fault-based testing de nes faults in terms of their syntax.
Fault-based testing also evaluates inputs based on their ability to distinguish the speci c faults. Mutation testing 22, 7, 19, 20 is a fault-based testing strategy that does just this| it evaluates program inputs. It takes a program P and produces n versions mutants of P, p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n , that are syntactically di erent from P. The goal of strong mutation testing 22 is to nd a set of inputs that distinguishes the mutants from P.
Another variant of mutation testing, weak mutation testing 7 , selects inputs that cause all imagined infections to be created by a possibly in nite set of mutants. Infection analysis statistically measures the e ect a set of mutants have on data states. Syntactic changes are made to program locations and infection analysis nds the probability that a particular mutant a ects a data state.
Infection analysis estimates an infection probability for each m utant m ly 2 M l . The estimate of some infection probability m ly lPD is termed an infection estimate and is denoted by m ly lPD | it is found by the following algorithm:
1. Set variable count to 0. 6. Divide count by n yielding the sample mean of numberof times that f l Z6 =fm ly Z n ; this is our m ly lPD . The mutants that have been used in this research have been limited to mutants of arithmetic expressions and predicates. For arithmetic expressions, the mutants considered in our research are limited to single changes to a location|this is similar to the mutations used in mutation testing 22, 7, 19, 20 . Our assignment statement mutants are: 1 a wrong variable substitution, 2 a variable substituted for a constant, 3 a constant substituted for a variable, 4 expression omission, and 5 a wrong operator. For boolean predicates, our mutants are: 1 substituting a wrong variable, 2 exchanging and and or, and 3 substituting a wrong equality inequality operator. We h a ve purposely limited the syntactic changes to single changes to avoid the explosion that occurs in the numberof combinatorial changes that could bemade at each location.
One di culty with mutants is determining semantic equivalence between the mutant and the original location. In infection analysis, we have handled this problem as follows: If we ever receive a 0.0 infection estimate, we statically trace the code to attempt to determine whether any data state Z will ever exist in the B lPx s such that f m ly Z 6 = f l Z. If we do determine semantic equivalence, we discard the mutant from the set and ignore its infection estimate. If we determine that they are not semantically equivalent, we allow the infection estimate to stand. If we are unable to make a determination due to circumstances such as code complexity, w e allow the infection estimate to stand.
In summary, infection analysis reveals statistical information about the e ect that mutants have on data states. All of the problems associated with generating mutants in mutation testing exist in infection analysis as well. In this initial stage of our research, we h a ve closely followed the mutation techniques developed by 22, 7 , 1 9 , 20 ; as our experience with PIE analysis increases, we expect to gain insight i n to the strengths and weaknesses of di erent mutation techniques.
Propagation Analysis
In this section, we discuss using simulated infections to predict the propagation of actual infections if they exist. Propagation analysis estimates propagation probabilities. The propagation estimate of propagation probability ailPD is denoted by ailPD |it is found by the following algorithm:
1 count; increment count if a time limit for termination related to the altered state has been exceeded. The time limitation should be a function of the time for completion required using the non-altered state Z. This precaution is necessary because of the e ects that altered variables can cause to boolean conditions that terminate inde nite loops. Of course we cannot be certain that termination using the altered state Z will not eventually occur, however we must set some time limit or this algorithm might never terminate. 5. Repeat steps 2-4 n times.
6. Divide count by n yielding the sample mean of numberof times that program output di ered n ; this is our ailPD .
In propagation analysis, a simulated infection is created by a perturbation function. The process of injecting a simulated infection is termed perturbing. A perturbation function is a mathematical function that takes in a data state as an incoming parameter, changes it according to certain parameters that are either input to the function or hard-wired, and produces as output a di erent data state. A data state that has had a value changed by a perturbation function is said to have been perturbed. We only perturb live variables within a data state because we already know from the de nition of live that perturbing a variable in a data state which is not live will result in a 0.0 propagation probability.
Perturbation functions can create a wide variety of simulated infections by using a pseudorandom numbergenerator|we use the Lehmer pseudo-random numbergenerator with a xed initial seed described in 13 . To perturb, we actually insert the necessary code to cause a state perturbation into the program under analysis. We do so by inserting a source-code module containing the pseudo-random numbergenerator into the code under analysis, and place a call to this module from the location where we want a data state perturbed. We send the module the current data state value and the module returns the perturbed data state value. To date, we have only perturbed numeric data state values; perturbing non-numeric data state values is an area of future research.
The decision concerning when during execution to inject a simulated infection is important t o the resulting propagation estimates. That is, during which iteration or iterations of a location do we apply a perturbation function? For example, if a location is in a loop that iterates three times, then we can inject a simulated infection on any of the following combinations of iterations: 1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 1, 3, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3. Note that if we do decide to inject a simulated infection on more than one execution of a location, the simulated infection a ects the same variable on each iteration. We currently do not perturb on combinations of variables, due to the explosion in the number of potential combinations. This too is an area for future research.
The choice of how and when to apply a simulated infection depends on the type of data state error we are simulating. Recall that propagation analysis simulates the occurrence of data state errors, and it is important that the simulated infection mimic the real-world, i.e., we m ust simulate the types of data state errors that actual faults create. For example, since faults in a conditional location can a ect which branch is taken after the conditional location, we include the program counter as a live variable; this allows us to perturb the program counter by using an enumerated type whose members are the di erent locations that could be executed after the conditional location is executed and randomly selecting a member of the type as the perturbed program counter value. As another example, if the type of data state error being simulated can be mapped to a type of fault that has a tendency to produce a data state error each time a fault from this class is executed, then a perturbation function is applied in A lPix for each i. An example is o -by-one faults, which always infect when executed. In general, mapping simulated infections to potential actual faults will not bepossible, since potential faults are very di cult to determine. So in our research experiments we have perturbed on each iteration meaning we apply a perturbation function to the current data state value even if that value was a result of a previous perturbation since our experience has shown that faults frequently infect on each iteration.
To handle perturbing on each iteration of a location, we de ne a variant of the previously de ned propagation probability; this variant handles the case where a simulated infection is injected into a variable on every iteration of a location. alPD is the probability that P's output di ers given that the value of variable a is perturbed in each data state succeeding location l.
Possible distributions for perturbation functions include all continuous and discrete distributions. To date, we have used a uniform distribution because of our lack of knowledge as to which distribution is best if a best" exists. Also, the uniform distribution has given encouraging results that are presented in x5.
Understanding the Resulting Estimates
When PIE analysis is completed for the entire program, we have three sets of probability estimates for each program location l in P given a particular distribution D:
1. Set 1: Execution estimate|the estimate of the probability that program location l is executed. 2. Set 2: Infection estimates|the estimates of the probabilities, one estimate for each m utant in M l at program location l, that given the program location is executed, the mutant will adversely a ect the data state. 3. Set 3: Propagation estimates|the estimates of the probabilities, one estimate for each live v ariable at program location l, that given that the variable in the data state following location l changes, the program output that results changes. Note that each probability estimate has an associated con dence interval, given a particular level of con dence and the value of n used in the algorithms. The computational resources available when PIE analysis is performed will determine an n for each algorithm. For example, for 95 con dence, the con dence interval is approximately p 2 q p1 , p=n, where p is the sample mean 21, 8 . Since the ns used in the algorithms are expected to be large, 2 q p1 , p=n will likely be insigni cant.
It should benoted that PIE analysis is a technique that can su er from qualitative errors and thus con dence intervals play a minor role in any con dence in the probability estimates. This is because we are making rough approximations via perturbation functions and mutants. Our con dence in the value of these approximations is not a result of 95 or 99 con dence intervals, but rather because the approximations have been shown experimentally to often re ect the e ect actual faults cause.
Feasibility of Implementing the PIE Algorithms
The feasibility o f PIE analysis as a practical method lies in the ability o f the infection analysis and propagation analysis algorithms to sample internal data states. 6 . lP are not necessarily recursive, since no algorithm exists that will tell us whether P will halt on an arbitrary input x 26 . The sets, however, may be partially computable, since we can sometimes nd a subset of for which P halts on each element. It is unsolvable to decide whether or not we can nd such a subset. Since these theoretical problems can impose serious practical limitations on PIE analysis, this section describes a mechanism by which infection analysis and propagation analysis can sometimes get the data states they need even though the above sets are not necessarily recursive.
It is not possible to determine whether an arbitrary input causes a particular location to be executed. If possible, the famed halting problem would besolved. But we can select a speci c input, execute the program on the input, and if the program halts in some xed period of time that we have preset, we can determine whether the input executed a particular location. Thus assuming we are able restrict to a nite subset denoted by by already knowing that each memberof is an input on which P halts in some xed period of time that we set, the sets 5 . lP , where lP = fB lPx j x 2 g 6. $ lP , where $ lP = fA lPx j x 2 g are recursive. Thus in practice, the algorithms in x3 will need to sample data states from these six sets. So Step 2 i n t h e infection analysis algorithm is replaced by: 2. Uniformly select an input x in , and nd the corresponding B lPx in lP . Uniformly select a data state Z from this B lPx .
and
Step 2 i n t h e propagation analysis algorithm is replaced by:
2. Uniformly select an input x in , and nd the corresponding A lPx in $ lP . Set Z to A lPix .
In practice then, PIE analysis becomes a function of a set of inputs, selected at random according to D, on which P halts in a xed period of time. Unfortunately, this means that propagation estimates and infection estimates may be a function of an input distribution that is far di erent than D. As already mentioned, this situation may also impact execution estimates if we nd that during execution analysis we must restrict the inputs used because some of the inputs selected according to D appear to be causing non-terminating computations. Our scheme for generating is simple: Set a program execution time limit and sample k inputs according to D from . To determine if a particular input x from the k inputs should be in , execute P on x and keep account of the time that passes during execution. If the amount of time used equals the time limit and termination has not occurred, do not include x in . This does not mean that P will not halt on x, but rather that we are not going to wait to nd out.
If P halts within the time limit for some x, x is added to . We apply this method for each of the k inputs.
As execution analysis is performed, data states are created from which infection analysis and propagation analysis could sample if the data states were stored. Assuming that execution analysis selects inputs on which our program halts in the xed amount of time mentioned earlier, then execution analysis generates members of $ lP and lP ; it just does not store them.
If we were able to store the data states that occur during execution analysis, it is not necessarily the case that we will generate as many data states during execution analysis as the infection analysis and propagation analysis algorithms need for the desired level of con dence in the estimates See x3.4. Those locations that were infrequently executed during execution analysis will have few data states stored for them.
For infrequently executed locations, we have 3 options for dealing with the small numberof data states available for infection analysis and propagation analysis:
1. Continue to execute the program during execution analysis until enough data states are created. 2. Ignore the location during propagation analysis and infection analysis. 3. Follow a heuristic like Korel's 11 for nding test data that executes the location. The rst option is not practical; the second option is practical but limits the information produced by the technique, and the third option has the potential to bias the resulting estimates if the heuristic generates inputs that do execute the location but are not in . Therefore, we consider option 2 as the only practical option.
Because data states are needed by both infection analysis and propagation analysis, we recommend that execution analysis be performed before the other algorithms. Even if we cannot store the data states created during execution analysis, information concerning the costs of getting a data state during infection analysis and propagation analysis is immediately available from the execution estimates. In practice, we believe that propagation analysis and infection analysis is only viable for frequently executed locations.
Sensitivity Analysis
The remainder of the paper focuses on making predictions. Our goal is to show how the information of PIE analysis can complement software testing.
We s a y that a fault can more easily hide from software testing when the fault's e ect on the computation is di cult to discern. x4 shows 1 how to apply the propagation, infection, and execution estimates in order to make predictions about where faults can more easily hide and 2 how to quantify the number of tests necessary to be convinced that a location is not hiding a fault from detection. Note the shift in emphasis here|from estimation that PIE analysis performs to prediction. Sensitivity analysis SA predicts where faults can hide 12 . Sensitivity analysis uses PIE analysis's estimates to predict the minimum e ect on the failure probability that a particular location would have if a fault were present, i.e., SA ranks program locations based on their ability t o impact the program's computation.
With sensitivity analysis, a framework is created for addressing the following questions: 1 Where can we get the maximum bene t from limited testing resources? 2 When should we use another validation technique other than testing? 3 What degree of testing must be performed to persuade ourselves that a location is probably not hiding a fault? 4 When should we rewrite the software in a manner that makes it less likely to hide faults?
Sensitivity of a location l is a prediction of the minimum probability that a fault in l will result in a software failure under a particular program input distribution. If location l is assigned a sensitivity of 1.0 under a particular input distribution D, then it is predicted that each input in D that executes l will result in a software failure if l were to contain a fault. If l is assigned a sensitivity of 0.0 under D, then it is predicted that no matter what fault is present i n l, no input in D that executes l will cause a failure. Note that there is a continuum of sensitivities in 0,1 . The greater the likelihood that a fault in location l will be revealed during testing, the greater the sensitivity that is assigned to l. A location with a low sensitivity is termed insensitive. A location with a high sensitivity is termed sensitive.
Testing either reveals or does not reveal faults; SA quanti es the signi cance of testing when testing reveals no faults. If testing's goal is to estimate the probability o f failure, sensitivity is not an issue. Sensitivity is only an issue when testing's goal is to reveal faults. SA allows us to gauge how much trust we can place in testing for faults.
As an example, consider a simple program P: P is supposed to perform the function described in the braces but contains a fault in location 4. The fault in location 4 is the addition of 1000 to variable d. Assume that testing P under a particular input probability distribution D produces no failures. What does this testing say about the existence of faults in P? While we can make predictions about P's probability of failure under D, w e do not have a n y assurances about an absence of faults in P. This is because: 1 the tests selected from D may not execute portions of P where the faults if any reside, 2 incorrect data states may not beproduced, or 3 incorrect data states may b e cancelled. For P, Figure 1i and Figure 1ii contain input probability distributions that are not likely to reveal the fault in location 4. If the range of potential input values for variables a, b, and c were xed in the interval 545, 550 , then the fault is more likely to becaught during testing. SA would warn that locations 4, 5, and 6 have a greater capacity to hide faults when testing is performed according to the input probability distributions in Figure 1i or Figure 1ii . PIE analysis's probability estimates for P given that Figure 1i or Figure 1ii were used follow:
1. Execution analysis reveals that there is a zero probability of a fault existing in locations 4, 5, and 6 and not being executed, and thus produce" 4P D = 1 :0," 5P D = 1 :0, and" 6P D = 1 :0. 2. Infection analysis reveals that locations 4, 5, and 6 produce high infection estimates, suggesting that actual faults in the locations would almost certainly produce infections. 3. Unlike the high probability estimates of infection analysis and execution analysis, propagation analysis tells something quite di erent. Propagation analysis will produce low propagation estimates for variables d, e, and f at locations 4, 5, and 6. Mapping the probability estimates for a location to a single sensitivity for that location is di cult, because determining the relative importance for each di erent set of probability estimates is di cult. Since each estimate has an associated con dence interval, we take the lower bound on the con dence interval. This assures that if bias occurs when nding a sensitivity, the bias causes underestimation of the sensitivity rather than overestimation. This conservative approach is taken one step further by only considering the minimum of the lower bounds of the infection estimates and the minimum of the lower bounds of the propagation estimates of a location when determining the location's sensitivity.
We take the conservative approach because we would rather label a location as unsafe" likely to hide faults when it is actually safe" not likely to hide faults than to label an unsafe location as safe. Believing that a location is more capable of revealing a fault when untrue is the negative e ect associated with overestimated probability estimates that we mentioned earlier. This is the reason that a narrower interval is advocated for the perturbation function parameters|to lessen the likelihood of overestimated propagation estimates.
Let min denote the lower bound for the con dence interval for an estimate, and let max denote the upper bound for the con dence interval for an estimate. The scheme for mapping PIE analysis's probability estimates into a sensitivity prediction of some location l, denoted by l , assuming that location l was executed frequently enough to obtain propagation and infection estimates follows: represents a prediction of the minimum probability that if a fault were to exist in l, the existence of the fault will be revealed through testing. Note that in equation 1, min a alPD min may be substituted for min a ailPD min . In this equation, we subtract the minimum proportion of data states that did not propagate when perturbed, i.e., 1,min a ailPD min from the proportion of data states, min m ly m ly lPD min , that did cause an infection by m utant m ly . We then take the result and multiply multiply it by the lower bound on the execution estimate for the location. This is a very conservative approach to sensitivity|this approach is taken to avoid the possibility that the data states represented in the proportion min m ly m ly lPD min are the data states represented in the proportion 1 , min a ailPD min 14 .
For locations that were not frequently executed, and thus did not receive infection or propagation analysis, we cannot directly apply equation 1. We therefore can only warn that these are locations of high insensitivity, and present the execution estimate as proof of this insensitivity.
With sensitivities in hand, we now return to the four proposed questions and explain how SA can begin to answer them.
1. Where to get the most bene t from limited testing resources: Sensitive locations require less testing than insensitive locations. By identifying sensitive locations, sensitivity analysis saves resources that can be applied to more critical insensitive locations.
When to use some other validation technique other than testing:
Sensitivity analysis may show extreme insensitivity greater potential for the hiding of faults, thereby pinpointing locations for which no reasonable amount of testing under an assumed distribution can be performed to gain con dence in such locations' lack of faults. At such locations, alternative techniques should beapplied such as testing under a new distribution, proofs of correctness, code review, symbolic testing 16, 15, 17, 18, 3 , or exhaustive testing. 3. The degree to which testing must be performed in order to be convinced that a location is probably not protecting a fault from detection: Sensitivity analysis results may be used to determined how many test cases are necessary to beconvinced a location is correct with an acceptable con dence. l can beused as an estimate of the minimum failure probability for location l in the equation 1 ,1, l T = c 6 , where c is the con dence that the actual failure probability of location l is less than l . With this equation, we can obtain the number of tests T needed for a particular c. To obtain con dence c that the true failure probability of a location l is less than l given the sensitivity o f t h e location, we need to conduct T tests that execute the location, where
. Whether or not software should be rewritten: Sensitivity analysis results may beused as a guide to whether critical software has been su ciently tested. If a piece of critical software is classi ed as having many insensitive locations, then the software may be rejected since too much testing will be required to achieve a su cient level of con dence from testing.
An Experiment Comparing PIE Estimates to Failure Probabilities
We present evidence here that propagation analysis and execution analysis accurately estimate the e ect that faults have on the failure probability o f a program. The experiment proceeds in two stages: 1. We inject a fault into a correct program. We assume a certain input distribution and establish an estimate of the failure probability of the now faulty program via random software testing. For the results shown here, we purposely injected faults with probabilities of creating data state errors of approximately 1.0 so that the likelihood of low probabilities of creating data state errors a ecting the failure probability was negligible. The faults used were removing an assignment statement or changing an operator in an arithmetic expression. 2. We perform propagation analysis and execution analysis on the faulty program, and use the propagation analysis and execution analysis estimates to predict a probability of failure for the location where we injected the fault. Our hypothesis is that there will be a signi cant correlation coe cient between the estimate of the probability of failure measured by random software testing and the probability of failure predicted by the estimates of propagation analysis and execution analysis.
The results reported here are based on the gold-version, G, of a battle simulation that was approximately 2000 lines in length and is speci ed in 23 . The experiment proceeded as follows:
1. Make a copy of G, denoted by G 0 . 2. Randomly select some location l of G. Table 1 and Table  2 for more speci c details of the experiment. We multiply the execution estimate and the propagation estimate because propagation estimates are conditioned on executing a location.
The results presented here used a perturbation function containing a uniform distribution with 0.5current value and 1.5current value as parameters; these parameters were chosen ad hoc to get quick initial feedback on propagation analysis. We are careful when using this distribution and parameters to make sure that the result is di erent than current value, and if current value is originally 0, that we randomly generate a value that is close to 0 but not 0.
Although this perturbation function gave encouraging results, the topic of creating perturbation functions requires more research.
The reason for the success of the uniform0.5current value, 1.5current value perturbation function is not completely clear. On possible reason is that the potential values that result from this distribution are in a narrow interval. We conjecture that the greater the distance between a correct and incorrect data state value, the greater the probability of propagation; thus a narrower interval lessens the probability of the propagation estimates being biased upwards. This conjecture is yet unsubstantiated.
Using the correlation coe cient formula CovQ;Y p VarQVarY , where CovQ; Y is the covariance of random variables Q and Y , and VarQ is the variance of random variable Q 1 , the correlation coe cient between the probability of failure predicted by propagation analysis and execution analysis and the estimate of the probability of failure measured by random testing was 0.975 for the 25 injected faults. As seen in Table 2 is not. Since perturbation functions attempt to create internal data state alterations that represent the internal state errors of many faults, it will sometimes occur that the propagation behavior observed from a speci c fault will be di erent than the propagation behavior resulting from the use of a random number generator. Even though this is a drawback of this approximation technique, preliminary trials have suggested that propagation estimates are still frequently accurate. Additional data from other experiments is currently being collected.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a technique based on the three necessary and su cient conditions for software to fail. The PIE analysis technique dynamically estimates program characteristics that a ect a program's computation. This technique does not need a speci cation nor oracle and may beperformed on incorrect programs. We believe that the information collected about the e ect of individual locations on the program's computational behavior has diverse applications: including where to emphasize testing resources, the degree of testing resources needed for this emphasis, and predicting software testability.
Plans are underway to automate PIE analysis. As mentioned in x3.5, there are obstacles into developing such a system, namely creating the sets of data states needed by infection and propagation analysis, and determining semantic equivalence between mutants and the original code. Regardless, a partially automated prototype for C programs that requires human intervention in certain circumstances is currently under development. This system will reduce tremendously the manual e ort necessary to complete PIE analysis enormously, allowing PIE analysis to be applied to larger software systems. 
